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Abstract. This paper covers a hybrid framework to studying coordi-
nated social media behaviour. The study focuses on social media activ-
ity during the 2019 Philippine National and Local Elections. With the
use of social media information obtained from the CrowdTangle plat-
form, the research is able to extract necessary post detail information
that can be used to determine coordinated behaviour. The study tags
posts are coordinated if they have shared media content between five
(5) or more posts within a one minute period. This should point to a
high degree of coordination. The results are then visualized using the
Fruchterman-Reingold algorithm using the networkx library to see the
various clusters. This gives us a reasonable amount of data to further
explore and act upon. This framework was able to extract a number of
Facebook accounts that showed a high degree of coordinated behaviour.
These accounts refer to media that are no longer available which is not
characteristic of reputable content.
Keywords: social media, elections, content networks, coordinated in-
authentic behaviour, crowdtangle
1 Introduction
There is an ongoing battle for our hearts and minds. The battlefield is social
media. There have been a lot of concerns raised about population manipulation
with the use of social media[5]. There is an increased use of social media as
a tool for political propaganda and even cyber-warfare. This is done with the
proliferation of misinformation and disinformation. One of the major ways in
which this is executed is the use of multiple coordinated accounts to simulate
multiple parties in these social networks. These coordinated activities can point
us towards networks used to propagate misinformation and dis-information to
sow discord[6].
This is particularly problematic in a country like the Philippines with a pop-
ulation of nearly 110 million people. Of the 110 million, 79 million will have
Internet access and 71.8 million will have Facebook access[1]. This means that
over 90% of Filipino Internet users are on Facebook. This is how powerful Face-
book is as a platform in the country. In a survey by the Social Weather Station
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(SWS), it is shown that 31% of Filipino social media users like or promote ma-
terial related to political or social issues that others have posted. Additionally,
14% follow elected officials, candidates for office, or other political figures. With
45% of users using Facebook to get the news at least on a daily basis. Add 14%
of users who get the news from Facebook a few days a week[2]. This is 59% of
users using Facebook for news. This points to a high degree of political use of
social media particularly Facebook.
Facebook has introduced the concept of coordinated inauthentic behaviour
(CIB)[8]. This is where various pages and fictitious accounts used to mislead
people. This mechanism does not look at the content of the post but focuses on
the behaviour of the actors behind these posts. For example, if a single person
pretends to be multiple people in a social media platform for the purposes of
making it seem there are many followers and supporters of a particular view then
that is potentially a violation of that social media platform’s code of content and
likely CIB.
This paper aims to look at a framework for looking at coordinated behaviour.
It also looks at the shared content to determine possible propaganda content.
The findings are then applied the Philippine National and Local Elections of 2019
(NLE 2019). This is our latest electoral exercise which gives us an opportunity to
look at various coordinated behaviours. Elections have been a popular venue for
spreading disinformation. A substantial amount of time has already passed to
we can see if these detected pages have already been taken down. This particular
study will focus on making observations on coordinated-ness of players but does
not attempt to determine whether they are authentic or not. This framework is
generalized to be able to be used for other events where we would like to look at
this type of coordinated behaviour. There is also incentive for operators in the
field of information dissemination to re-use pre-established networks.
2 Finding Coordinated Behaviour in Social Media
The study of coordinated behaviour in social media is still emerging. There have
been a number of studies that aim to use computation methods to determine
coordinated behaviour. In their paper, Giglietto et al use platforms and various
computational methods to study the spread of problematic information in con-
temporary media system (ie. social media). They also describe the issues with
studying problematic information detection.
For this study, we focus on using the assumption that coordinated users will
create content and try to distribute it with their established network which have
a degree of coordination[9][10]. This is to maximize the effectiveness of the cam-
paign. This allows the operators of these social media accounts to take advantage
of network effects. It is also this network effect that makes it valuable to the op-
erator. Social media network algorithms are designed to feature or highlight
content that is popular. Using multiple of these networks with their own base of
users, operators can boost a post’s popularity within the platform. In this pa-
per, we will count on these operators taking advantage of this mechanism. Thus,
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we look for behaviour that attempts to coordinate posting amongst multiple
accounts in their network. Each of these coordinated accounts will have pages
or groups with multiple established users as well. This establishes a powerful
networked base for information propagation.
This work extends existing work on coordination. It basically attempt to look
deeper into the content by first using coordination as a filter then performing
analysis on the content itself. The filter is key to make the volume of content
more manageable for manual analysis. This is why we call it a hybrid approach.
3 Hybrid Approach to Finding Coordinated Behaviour
One of the key differences of this approach is to use both computational and
manual methods to detect potential problematic coordinated behaviour. Major-
ity of the computation aspect is used to manage the sheer volume of the data.
The manual aspect to look for potential outliers in the dataset. We attempt to
implement this framework in the context of the posts made in a four month
period covering NLE 2019 which was held on May 2019.
3.1 Computational Extraction and Detection of Networks
The first step is to analyse the large amount of digital information from social
media platforms into a smaller subset suitable for further manual analysis.
The study makes use of social media data aggregated by CrowdTangle[11].
CrowdTangle (CT) is a service that aggregates information about posts from
various social media platforms such as Facebook and Instagram. It provides in-
formation about each post including information on sentiment. CT has a Search
API that provides additional post details including post history and the details
of the media contents that was shared. This information is important in our re-
search as we use the media information to determine coordinated behaviour. In
this paper, similar shared media synchronous shared are considered coordinated.
Our approach to the detection of these coordinated behaviour computation
uses the fact that a lot of these coordinated posts use common and shared content
such as photos or videos. So we use the additional media information provided
by the CT Search API to determine what posts share the same media.
The Search API query parameters used for this particular dataset are cov-
ered in Table 1. The CT search yielded the following dataset for processing
summarized in Table 2. The study is limited to articles created and posted by
non-verified Philippine-based Facebook accounts from the period Feb 1 to May
31 2019.
To simplify analysis, we first removed all verified accounts. This is generally
to remove legitimate media sites and organizations that have already had their
pages verified by the social media platform provider. It is assumed that the social
media platform provider has already performed the required vetting for those
accounts.
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Parameter Value
Period Feb 1 2019 00:00:36 to May 31 2019 23:47:22
Platforms Facebook Pages/Public Groups
Keywords elections, halalan, ppcrv, comelec, namfrel
Country of Page Admin Philippines
Table 1. Input Parameters for Dataset
Property Values
Number of posts returned 63,475
Number of unique accounts (by ID) 5,387
Number of posts with shared media 60,680
Verified Accounts 472
Country of Poster Philippines
Table 2. Summary of Dataset Characteristics
The next step is to determine coordinated behaviour. As mentioned previ-
ously, coordinated behaviour is detected by tracking the media content that was
shared by multiple posts. This includes photos and videos. The idea is that if
the same media was shared by different pages then this can point to coordinated
behaviour if done within a certain period of time. For this particular study, we
used one (1) minute as that time period. Therefore, if multiple posts shared the
same media content within a one (1) minute period then they will be flagged as
coordinated.
Additionally, in order to limit the number of results that get flagged, we also
set another criteria for flagging a post as coordinated. Initially, this was set to
media in posts shared by five (5) or more pages that posted the same media
within that one minute period. This is a high degree of coordination to make the
results more manageable. This allows for a good deal of visualization on highly
coordinated activities. The number of posts shared can be adjusted depending
on the volume of output of the later visualization.
This study uses Python and Pandas[3] to process the information. Pandas
provides a ready to use framework for processing large volumes of data. These
tools are used to implement the algorithm above to filter data that is used. The
accounts of those posts with common media are considered coordinated. The
various accounts are then placed in a table that shows the other accounts they
are sharing content with. The data is then visualized using a package called
networkx[4]. In particular, the Fruchterman-Reingold algorithm was used to vi-
sualize the data. This algorithm is a force-directed graph drawing algorithm
which aims to position nodes in the graph in a two-dimensional space that aims
to ensure that all the edges are of more or less equal length and there are as few
crossing edges as possible. This makes it easier to visualize clusters of interaction
between the nodes. This algorithm was used as it allows a better visualization
for the next stage of our framework.
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Figure 1 shows the execution on the data obtained by the system. As an
observation, there are some clusters that refer to established but not verified
media groups such as some RMN (Figure 4) and ABS/TFC (Figure 3) accounts.
There is also a group aligned with an education institution (Figure 2). There are
then politically aligned groups shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6. These clusters
are easily identifiable as the graphing algorithm presents them in a manner that
they are easily visually clustered.
Fig. 1. Initial Plot of Coordinated Accounts
Fig. 2. STI Cluster Highlighted
3.2 Cleaning up the data
For observations made in the cluster, the next step is to study the content
shared by these entities in a little more detail. Upon closer analysis of the shared
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Fig. 3. ABS-CBN/TFC Highlighted
Fig. 4. RMN Cluster Highlighted
Fig. 5. Cagayan Cluster Highlighted
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Fig. 6. PDU Cluster Highlighted
content, the first class of content refers to common media elements shared by
unverified media entities like Sunstar and RMN. In Figure 7, it can be seen that
these are valid news articles but the photo tagged as shared is the company
logo. This is likely because of their content management platform(CMP)’s open
graph settings. Facebook uses OpenGraph provided content as the basis for
what appears in the Facebook feed[12]. So it is simply placeholder content that
is common and not the specific article content itself. Ideally, this image should
be customized per news article. So this can be removed from further analysis as
coordinated behaviour.
Fig. 7. Sunstar Shared Content versus Shared Media
There are also other groups that have a strong degree of content sharing
within affiliated groups. Examples of this is the ABS-CBN group which has the
main ABS-CBN page and the various TFC regional pages and the STI group
of education institutions. Figure 8 shows examples of this shared content from
these entities whose pages are really coordinated.
The rest of the content is shared from URLs that no longer exist or have
been taken down which is quite suspicious. This refers to sites hosted under
the domains astigpinoy.net and nfac.elgoal.net. These are the contents left for
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Fig. 8. Content Shared by Various Other Groups
the current stage of the analysis. But, they are gone. It is also suspicious that
these articles are no longer published. Any reputable author or journalist would
normally ensure that their content continues to be published even after the event
for proper attribution. Mainstream writers do not fear fact checking.
3.3 Looking at the data again
After removing the entities flagged during the manual clean-up stage, Figure
9 provides the updated view of the coordinated entities. The accounts left in
this analysis refer to highly coordinated sites that are all political in nature. In
fact, the majority of the pages are aligned with the current chief executive of
the country. This is summarized in Table 3. This gives us a list of accounts that
are highly coordinated. We are not in a position to determine if the previously
shared content is fake or not. The content has already been taken down. But,
it is clear that these sites are coordinated and are continually used as networks
for propaganda purposes. Under the current guidelines of Facebook, could be
inauthentic behaviour. A good number of these accounts are still active. This
means that these pages can still be used as vehicles for propaganda.
Fig. 9. Cleaned up Plot of Coordinated Accounts

















Table 3. Summary of Highly Coordinated Accounts
4 Conclusions
This framework demonstrates a hybrid approach to looking at coordinated and
potentially inauthentic behaviour that uses both computation and manual mech-
anisms. The use of computational mechanisms allows us to process a large
amount of social media data. By using the networkx with the Fruchterman-
Reingold algorithm, it is easier to see what these coordinated networks are and
to give additional insight for this analysis. The manual mechanism is then used
to vet the flagged shared content used to float issues such as mis-configured
opengraph content or validly coordinated groups such as the education insti-
tution and the unverified media entities. These are exceptions to the rule that
can easily be flagged by a human expert (ie. knowing known media entities and
affiliates). Upon validation of media for each cluster of content, there are some
shared content that are hosted in sites that no longer exist. This is one of the
benefits of doing a slightly delayed analysis. This is highly suspicious and is not
a characteristic of reputable content.
Hopefully, this paper has shared a practical hybrid means of detecting coordi-
nated behaviour for Facebook pages and groups. Pages and groups are magnets
for coordinated user account behaviour. This is considering the fact that opera-
tors would like to take advantage of network effects. We might not have access
to user account data in this dataset. But, looking at coordinated behaviour in
public pages and groups can be a starting point for further investigation. In this
day in age, the most valuable commodity is now one’s attention. It is critical
that we equip ourselves with the tools to better detect and understand these
attempts to hack the attention economy [7].
For future research, the framework can be applied to process data in a more
real-time manner and other themes for further investigation. Real-time process-
ing can be used for pro-active detection of coordinated behaviour for further
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investigation. Other themes can also be applied to the social media data set
which is now made available by CrowdTangle for research purposes.
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